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]]>By Mike Jumper, CEO and Co-founder of Glyptodon
They were right. Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), already a common target, has become even more heavily targeted. According to research from cybersecurity firm ESET, Windows RDP attacks rose an astounding 768% in 2020. In fact, malware like Trickbot now includes RDP scanners to search for open ports, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have been using RDP as a way to amplify their impact.
To be fair, the issue here is not RDP itself. RDP is a very useful and functionally rich protocol, and the open-source project I work on, Apache Guacamole, uses it internally with great success. The issue is the attack surface created by the position of the remote desktop service within the operating system. This can be eliminated with proper system design.
To enable a user to operate a machine remotely, RDP requires administrator-level privileges. Should an attacker exploit a vulnerability and execute arbitrary code, that code will inherit those privileges. A successful attack against a privileged service can be catastrophic mainly due to the privileges the attacker gains once they control that service.
Two of the vulnerabilities found in 2019, popularly known as BlueKeep and DejaBlue, can be exploited to do just that on unpatched Windows servers with public RDP services. This can result in the introduction of malware, the initiation of a ransomware attack, and allow hackers to move laterally across the network and infiltrate other computers.
As a privileged service, RDP should always be carefully guarded and never exposed publicly. Instead, all access should take place through an entirely independent service, one with tight controls and limited privileges so that a successful attack cannot result in gaining administrator status
A system should never remain unpatched. The reasons why are basic and abundantly clear: older, unpatched software possesses known vulnerabilities. That said, the foremost concern amongst CISOs regarding remote access should be unknown vulnerabilities. When a new vulnerability emerges, it is not always possible to patch the system before the vulnerability begins to be exploited, and it’s on the system’s design to protect against this.
When hackers exploit a vulnerability, they perform an action that a software’s security model should otherwise deny. CISOs must be sure IT sets boundaries that can be enforced independently through layers of protective services while limiting privileges to only what is essential for operation. Respectively, these are known as defense-in-depth and the principle of least privilege.
Authentication and authorization should not just be a part of connecting with RDP, they should be preconditions that are satisfied before RDP is even available. To this end, a remote desktop gateway should be the only way in and should be positioned in front of RDP. The gateway should provide access strictly to remote desktops assigned to specific users, and should operate with limited privileges to ensure an attacker cannot directly gain admin control if the gateway is compromised.
Virtual private networks (VPN) have been a popular approach for overcoming these hurdles. Unfortunately, they have a reputation for being sluggish and difficult to use, and deploying so generic a solution like a VPN can open up access to more of the private network than each user needs. With so many employees likely to remain remote post-pandemic, VPNs are not likely to provide a feasible solution for securing RDP at the enterprise level.
After deploying the gateway, IT should lock down the network firewall so that the gateway is the only means to access RDP from outside the network. Likewise, computers on the network should be locked down so that they allow access to RDP only via the gateway. By isolating remote desktops at the network level, a single hacked computer doesn’t put all computers in jeopardy.
For CISOs, securing RDP is simply a matter of ensuring that it’s deployed carefully so malicious actors have nothing to leverage. Place RDP services behind a secure gateway, apply patches in a timely manner, and follow best practices, and you’ll have a long-term solution for your remote future.
About the Author
Mike Jumper is the original developer of Apache Guacamole, an open-source remote desktop access gateway. He is CEO and co-founder of Glyptodon, which provides a commercial build of Apache Guacamole with enterprise support.
Disclaimer
Views expressed in this article are personal. The facts, opinions, and language in the article do not reflect the views of CISO MAG and CISO MAG does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same.
The post Designing a Secure Remote Future with Windows Remote Desktop Protocol appeared first on CISO MAG | Cyber Security Magazine.
]]>The post What is an RDP attack? appeared first on CISO MAG | Cyber Security Magazine.
]]>LabCorp (Laboratory Corp. of America) was hit by ransomware through an RDP attack in 2018. The ransomware infected thousands of PCs and almost 2,000 servers of this major medical testing facility. According to the Wall Street Journal report, the company was hit with a strain of ransomware known as SamSam. The hackers demanded $6,000 in bitcoin for each machine or $52,500 to unlock all encrypted devices, according to the alert from the National Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which coordinates health-industry responses to cyberattacks.
And earlier in the year, the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, regarded as the world’s busiest by passenger traffic, was also hit by an attack involving SamSam.
In 2018, the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) along with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released an alert stating, “Remote administration tools, such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), as an attack vector has been on the rise since mid-late 2016 with the rise of dark markets selling RDP Access.”
Microsoft software is used in over 90% of the world’s computers, and naturally, these have been widely targeted by hackers. We saw that with Internet Explorer, the Windows Operating systems released over the years, Windows Server software – and these days with Microsoft 365.
Microsoft introduced the Remote Desktop Protocol in 1996. Every Windows system since Windows XP uses RDP for remote connection. As employees became mobile and worked from different locations, there was a need to access corporate servers and workstations from remote locations. Two technologies emerged: VPN and RDP. But RDP is the more popular choice among users as it is built into Windows and offers more control of the host. An RDP client running on the user’s laptop or desktop (client) communicates with the RDP component on the server (host). And the communication between the two is encrypted (see illustration).

Ever since RDP was introduced, cybercriminals have been trying to hack into machines via this protocol – effectively launching a Windows RDP attack. RDP attacks continue to impact organizations worldwide to this day. Today, hackers are using RDP attacks to deploy ransomware and to lock up systems, severely crippling businesses – as in the LabCorp incident. These types of RDP attacks are becoming more common since they are lucrative.
RDP attacks occur through open RDP ports.
A computer has hardware and software ports for communicating with other devices and services. Hardware ports are easier to understand as they are physical. Look at the sides of your laptop and you will see different hardware ports for connecting devices – USB ports, HDMI ports, the legacy VGA and Firewire (Apple); Ethernet (network) port, display port, lightning connector (Apple), Thunderbolt (Apple), the power port, etc.
Software ports are logical channels to services on networks. For instance, websites are accessed through port 8080 (http), file transfer is port 20 or 21, and send email is port 25 (SMTP). These are defined by communication protocols that are followed by the industry – http, FTP, TCP/IP, and SMTP are protocols.
Here is an analogy. Cable TV offers hundreds of channels coming down to us on a single wire. But all these channels have separate communication paths in that wire. Those are like ports. Think of ports as communication channels.
There are thousands of services to access on networks – printing, FTP/file transfer, file sharing, remote access, etc. A port (and a unique port number) is designated for service.
You have ports for Remote Access as well, and often, these ports are unsecured and open for anyone to use. Hackers scan connected devices for open ports, and once they find these, they can access the endpoints. The endpoints are connected to the corporate network via TCP/IP and other protocols. So once the hacker gets into your connected endpoint (laptop, tablet, phone) – they can easily get into the corresponding network and deploy malware like ransomware.
The most common example of remote access today is your IT engineer logging into your laptop from a remote location to fix an issue. They would use remote connectivity software like AnyDesk or TeamViewer to do that. This is through RDP.
Another example is a traveling employee who may want to access some files stored on his office computer, which is thousands of miles away. The employee could use either VPN or RDP to do that.
Ports have default numbers. If you keep the RDP port to 3389 (default), then it is a security threat, since hackers know about this port. So, if you plan to open up RDP ports for Internet access, the first thing to do is change the default port number from 3389 to a number above 10000. Or, if you want to keep using port 3389, make sure the port is closed down after a remote access session.
Hackers use port scanning software to determine which ports are open on the targetted system. You can use this software to see all the open ports on your system — and close these ports. But the first thing to do is to change the default port number for RDP.
Change the default port number
Follow these steps to change the RDP port:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\
3. In the right-hand pane, double-click on PortNumber.
4. Change the value to Decimal and specify the new port number between 1001 to 254535.
5. Click OK.
6. Close the registry editor and restart your computer.
Warning: Do not try this if you are unfamiliar with the Window Registry and registry editing. Get your system administrator to do this for you.
Check if port 3389 is open and listening
You may open port 3389 to connect to a computer remotely and may forget to close it after the session. Or another user may have done this on a shared device.
Here’s how you can check if the port is open and listening:
You can also check the port using the command prompt or CLI (command line interface), but we will not discuss this here, as it is beyond the scope of this article.
Alternately, use a port scanning or vulnerability scanning tool like CurrPorts (NirSoft) that will scan all ports and list which ones are open.
Close port 3389 (if open)
This can be done either through the command line or through a utility like CurrPorts (NirSoft).

If a hacker comprises your system via an open RDP Port 3389, to deploy malware or ransomware, they could do the following:
Well, this might shake one up, if they did not already know this! So, what are you waiting for? Close your open RDP port now!
We also suggest a few more things to secure your systems:
About the Author
Brian Pereira is the Editor-in-Chief of CISO MAG. He has been writing on business technology concepts for the past 26 years and has achieved basic certifications in cloud computing (IBM) and cybersecurity (EC-Council).
The post What is an RDP attack? appeared first on CISO MAG | Cyber Security Magazine.
]]>The post Safeguarding Your Networks and Applications from the Risks of Remote Work with VPNs and RDP appeared first on CISO MAG | Cyber Security Magazine.
]]>By Gil Azrielant, CTO and Co-founder, Axis Security
VPNs are notoriously problematic to begin with, especially when paired with RDP’s security flaws. RDP has numerous known vulnerabilities (CVEs) registered against it. And even with patches, new vulnerabilities continue to emerge.
For an organization to thrive in this environment, they will need to adopt security measures when deploying Microsoft RDP-enabled access widely — ideally without having to constantly upgrade their servers. This is difficult when they have to provide remote access quickly, without the privilege of upgrading software.
For remote workers to do their jobs, they often need to connect to remote workstations, servers or applications within the company. That’s why so many organizations with Windows computers rely on both VPNs to get on the network and Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) via the Remote Desktop Connection application to get to a particular machine.
VPN enablement can be painful for both IT and end users. In fact, VPNs can aggravate RDP’s security flaws. While many have patches available, some may not be able to receive upgrades, resulting in untold numbers of vulnerable legacy servers, which may or may not be able to receive upgrades. And even with those patches, RDP vulnerabilities continue to emerge.
Common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) of RDP include BlueKeep, which allows cybercriminals to remotely take over a connected PC. We have listed relevant CVEs at the end of this post. Further, hackers continually use brute force attacks to try to obtain user credentials that have remote desktop access.
We recommend that, when using Microsoft’s RDP, organizations adopt additional security measures. Some are simply procedural. But whatever form they take, they are necessary to keep enterprise data safe.
Providing large scale urgent access while keeping users safe is not easy. But new access and security technologies make it possible without fiddling with VPNs or directly upgrading servers. A modern solution that is equipped to handle RDP’s vulnerabilities will provide a layer of security over all managed RDP servers. These solutions will analyze all user requests before they are securely forwarded to the RDP server. This protects the RDP host and its data by acting something like an RDP request broker.
This process of preventing the remote users from touching the applications effectively mitigates all those RDP-related CVE’s below, reducing the application attack surface and minimizing risk.
The most important thing to remember regarding RDP is to never put your RDP servers on the public Internet. Within minutes of public-facing RDP servers going out, they will be scanned, and then every hour numerous connection requests and exploitation attempts will take place. It is impractical that such legacy protocols can be secure on the Internet.
Other important steps that can be taken to protect against RDP vulnerabilities include:
The risks of enabling remote access are legitimate concerns for any enterprise. Traditional mitigation techniques, such as upgrading the server operating system, can take time and have cascading consequences. But new technologies are stepping up to improve access security and minimize complexity when it comes to VPNs and server software upgrades.
Here’s a partial list of CVEs related to RDP, which can be mitigated with the right steps taken and the support of the right technologies:
CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) – The exploitation requires the client to bind to a specific channel. Axis security has a whitelist of allowed channels, and the MS_T120 channel is blacklisted.
CVE-2020-0660 – Is caused by insufficient validation of requests, that allow a crafted-malformed request to be sent and crash the system. Malformed packets will never be sent from the Application Access Cloud to your servers, as it validates and disarms every request and response before sending it over.
RDP as implemented in versions of Windows, including Server 2008/12 R2, 7, 8.1, 10, are known vulnerable to exploits described:
CVE-2020-0609 – This vulnerability lies in Windows RD Gateway. We isolate your RD gateway from the internet, so no one can send malicious requests to it. Malformed packets will never be sent from the Application Access Cloud to your servers, as it validates and disarms every request and response before sending it over.
CVE-2020-0610 – This is very similar to the last one. This vulnerability lies in Windows RD Gateway. We isolate your RD gateway from the internet, so no one can send malicious requests to it. Malformed packets will never be sent from the Application Access Cloud to your servers, as it validates and disarms every request and response before sending it over.
CVE-2019-1181 – This vulnerability affects unpatched versions of Windows Server 2008-2019, and Windows 7-10. Our RDP service is not vulnerable to this vulnerability.
CVE-2019-1182 – This vulnerability affects unpatched versions of Windows Server 2008-2019, and Windows 7-10. Our RDP service is not vulnerable to this vulnerability.
CVE-2019-1222 – This vulnerability affects unpatched versions of Windows Server 2016-2019, and Windows 10. Our RDP service is not vulnerable to this vulnerability.
CVE-2019-1226 – This vulnerability affects unpatched versions of Windows Server 2016-2019, and Windows 10. Our RDP service is not vulnerable to this vulnerability.
About the Author
Gil Azrielant is the Co-founder and CTO of Axis Security. He is responsible for technology strategy and the development of the company’s cloud-based zero-trust application access platform. Gil’s cybersecurity career began in the elite Unit 8200 of the Israeli Army Intelligence Corps, where he worked on advanced cybersecurity and code decryption. He served five years inside this elite unit, working as a researcher and team leader.
Disclaimer
CISO MAG did not evaluate/test the products mentioned in this article, nor does it endorse any of the claims made by the writer. The facts, opinions, and language in the article do not reflect the views of CISO MAG and CISO MAG does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same. CISO MAG does not guarantee the satisfactory performance of the products mentioned in this article.
The post Safeguarding Your Networks and Applications from the Risks of Remote Work with VPNs and RDP appeared first on CISO MAG | Cyber Security Magazine.
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